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Abstract—We introduce BUG-INJECTOR, a system that auto-
matically creates benchmarks for customized evaluation of static
analysis tools. We share a benchmark generated using BUG-
INJECTOR and illustrate its efficacy by using it to evaluate the
recall of two leading open-source static analysis tools: Clang
Static Analyzer and Infer.
BUG-INJECTOR works by inserting bugs based on bug tem-
plates into real-world host programs. It runs tests on the host
program to collect dynamic traces, searches the traces for a
point where the state satisfies the preconditions for some bug
template, then modifies the host program to “inject” a bug
based on that template. Injected bugs are used as test cases
in a static analysis tool evaluation benchmark. Every test case is
accompanied by a program input that exercises the injected bug.
We have identified a broad range of requirements and desiderata
for bug benchmarks; our approach generates on-demand test
benchmarks that meet these requirements. It also allows us to
create customized benchmarks suitable for evaluating tools for a
specific use case (e.g., a given codebase and set of bug types).
Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the suitability of
our generated benchmark for evaluating static bug-detection tools
and for comparing the performance of different tools.
Index Terms—Bug Benchmarks; Static Analysis Evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
Several static analysis tools for finding bugs in programs ex-
ist today. Researchers in academia and industry are constantly
working on creating new tools and sophisticated techniques for
static bug finding. However, evaluating static analysis tools
remains a challenge. A good evaluation system will guide
impactful improvement in bug-finding tools by identifying
their blind spots, furthering their adoption and effective use.
There are multiple aspects of static analysis tools that are
important to evaluate. In this paper, however, we mainly focus
on one key evaluation metric for static analysis tools: recall.
Virtually all static analysis tools used widely for bug detection
on C/C++ programs are unsound [1]. Measuring the recall
of a tool helps understand the degree to which it is unsound.
Answering “how well can a tool find all the bugs in a program”,
i.e., recall, in a convincing manner is difficult. It is hard—
if not impossible—to enumerate all bugs in any non-trivial
program. However, we can estimate the recall of a tool by
counting how many previously-known bugs in a given set of
programs are found by the tool. Such estimated recall rates
can be particularly useful for comparing different tools or tool
configurations. There is a large body of previous work [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16],
[17] on creating benchmarks containing known bugs. Despite
this significant progress, a recent study by Delaitre et al. [18]
found that there is still a shortage of test cases for evaluating
static analysis tools and thus a need for real-world software
with ground-truth information about known bugs.
To address this need, we first discuss some desirable prop-
erties for a benchmark suite that contains known bugs and is
targeted towards evaluating static analysis tools.
Real-world-like. The benchmark’s programs should be repre-
sentative of real-world programs (e.g., in size and complexity).
Reliable ground truth. Each known bug in the benchmarks
should manifest on at least one execution of the program. If
they do not, any recall estimate based on the benchmarks is
not meaningful. Ideally, each known bug should come with a
proof-of-existence, such as an input that can trigger the bug.
Automated generation. To eliminate staleness, the tests in
the benchmark suite should be generated automatically: on
demand, without manual effort, in the quantity desired for
statistical significance.
Customizable. Users should be able to generate customized
benchmarks that are tailored to their codebases and bug distri-
bution expectations: one fixed benchmark does not suit all. For
example, Herter et al. [19] suggest that certain sectors (such
as the aerospace and automotive industries) deem recursive
function calls inappropriate. Similarly, not all bug classes are
equally important to all users of static analysis tools.
Broad coverage of bug types. Benchmarks should include
a broad variety of bugs: for example, bugs corresponding to a
large set of different Common Weakness Enumeration entries
(CWEs) [20]. Users can choose to customize their evaluation
by disregarding certain types of bugs.
Suitable for usefully evaluating and comparing the recall
of static analysis tools. Comparing the recall on the bench-
marks should discriminate between static analysis tools. The
benchmark tests should provide guidance to further improve
the recall of a given tool, e.g., by including bugs which are
within scope for the tool, but which the tool is unable to detect.
Implemented independently of evaluated techniques. To
avoid circularity, the techniques used to create the benchmark
suite should be independent of the techniques the benchmark
suite will be used to evaluate. Otherwise evaluations using the
benchmark suite will be biased by hiding shared limitations.
We address all of the above desired properties through BUG-
INJECTOR, a system that automatically generates benchmarks
containing known bugs. BUG-INJECTOR-generated bench-
marks have a broad range of applications, but the one we
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present in this paper is particularly suited to estimating and
comparing the recall rates of static analysis tools, such as the
open-source tools Clang Static Analyzer and Infer.
BUG-INJECTOR starts from (i) a set of bug templates
(§ III-B) that represent known bugs, (ii) a host program, i.e.,
an existing real-world software application, and (iii) a set of
tests to exercise the host program. It searches dynamic traces
of the host program to identify injection points where the state
satisfies a bug template’s preconditions. Using dynamic state to
identify bug injection locations, rather than using information
from static analyses, provides independence from bias and
from the limitations of static analysis techniques (such as
pointer analysis imprecision or SMT solver weaknesses). For
each of the identified injection points (or a random subset
thereof), BUG-INJECTOR creates a new variant of the host
program by inserting a bug based on the bug template, inte-
grating with existing data and control flow. BUG-INJECTOR
relies on existing data and control flow complexity in the host
programs to generate realistic contexts for injected bugs. BUG-
INJECTOR outputs multiple versions of each host program,
each containing one injected bug and identifying a concrete
program input that will trigger the injected bug.
BUG-INJECTOR can inject bugs from a broad range of bug
classes into programs of various sizes, functionality types,
and complexity levels (§V). This customizability allows for
additional uses of BUG-INJECTOR beyond tool evaluation.
For instance, a tool developer who creates analysis checkers
for a new kind of bug can use BUG-INJECTOR to generate
test cases containing bugs of that kind to quickly evaluate
the checker’s recall against real-world software (§ III-D). This
usage of BUG-INJECTOR can complement the typical method
of testing analysis checkers with small, hand-crafted tests.
The specific contributions of this paper are:
1) The BUG-INJECTOR system, a novel technique to auto-
matically generate customized, realistic benchmarks with
known bugs that can be triggered using accompanying
inputs. We describe BUG-INJECTOR’s architecture, func-
tionality, and underlying algorithms in § III. As far as
we know, BUG-INJECTOR is the only existing system
(Table I) capable of producing benchmarks that meets all
desired properties discussed above.
2) Openly-available benchmark suites (§V) generated using
BUG-INJECTOR. We have created bug templates (both
manually and automatically) from different sources cor-
responding to a wide variety of CWE [20] entries and
injected them into open-source real-world programs.
3) An extensive evaluation of two leading open-source static
analysis tools for C/C++ programs—Clang Static An-
alyzer (CSA) [21] and Infer [22]—on our generated
benchmarks. Our results (§VI), show that: (a) both of
these tools fail to detect bugs that are seemingly in scope
for them, (b) our benchmarks can be used to compare
the recall of the two tools, and (c) our benchmarks can
contrast two analysis configurations of CSA, showing
that BUG-INJECTOR can be used to automatically tune
analysis configurations customized to a codebase. We also
filed bug reports for CSA and Infer on certain missed
warnings. Additionally, we show that a closely related
work, LAVA [23], is not suitable for comparing static
analysis tools.
In the remainder of the paper, we compare to related work
(§ II), describe challenges in estimating tool recall (§ IV),
discuss limitations and future work (§VII), and conclude
(§VIII).
II. RELATED WORK
Creating bug-containing benchmarks for testing and eval-
uating bug-finding tools has attracted significant research
attention in recent years. In this section, we compare BUG-
INJECTOR to the closest related work, summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Summary comparing BUG-INJECTOR (BI) with
other closely related work across the different properties
outlined in I. Columns: EC=EvilCoder, Synth=Synthetic
benchmarks, Wild=wild caught bugs. Values: Ltd.=Limited,
Yes*=subject to some errors.
Property BI LAVA EC Synth Wild
Real-world-like Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Reliable ground truth Yes Yes No Yes* Ltd.
Automated, not fixed Yes Yes Yes No No
Customizable Yes Yes Yes No No
Wide coverage of CWEs Yes No No Yes No
Evaluate static tools? Yes No No Ltd. Ltd.
Independent? Yes Ltd. No Yes Yes
Synthetic benchmarks. Several efforts have targeted manual
creation of artificial test programs containing bugs. Some
prominent examples are: Juliet tests [2], the IARPA STONE-
SOUP snippets [3], Toyota ITC benchmarks [4], OWASP
WebGoat [5], Wilander et al., [6], [7], and ABM [8]. However,
synthetic benchmarks have limited applicability in identifying
how tools perform on real-world code.
Wild. Bugs may be mined and curated from real-world
software. Some prominent examples of such curated bug
collections are: BugZoo [9], BugSwarm [24], ManyBugs [25],
Defects4J [26], [27], BugBench [10], BugBox [11], Se-
curiBench [12], and Zitser et al., [13]. While they have the ad-
vantage of being real-world-like, they have varying degrees of
ground truth, and not all of them come with proof-of-existence.
There is also very little benchmark-user customizability with
respect to bug type coverage and distribution.
The curation of both wild and synthetic benchmarks requires
substantial manual effort and is prone to errors (e.g., both the
Juliet test cases and the Toyota ITC benchmarks have required
corrections [2], [19]). They are fixed and not customizable,
with pre-determined target code constructs and bug types.
They therefore have limited applicability for evaluating and
comparing the recall of static analysis tools. SARD [14] is
perhaps the largest openly available collection of known buggy
test programs, put together by the SAMATE group at NIST.
It contains both synthetic and wild benchmarks.
EvilCoder. This system [15] uses static analysis to find
sensitive sinks in a host program and connects them to a
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user-controlled source to inject taint-based bugs. A significant
disadvantage is that there is no guarantee that inserted bugs
are true positives—which makes it unsuitable for estimating
recall. Indeed, the paper does not evaluate bug-finding tools
on EvilCoder test cases. EvilCoder injected bugs inherit the
limitations of the static analysis tools used as a part of the
injection pipeline, and therefore may bias evaluation of other
static analysis tools. EvilCoder is limited to taint-based bugs.
LAVA. This system [16], [23] inserts bugs into host programs
by identifying situations where user-controlled input can trig-
ger an out-of-bounds read or write. LAVA bugs come with an
input to trigger the bug and are validated to check that they
return exit codes associated with buffer overflows. However,
this approach is limited to inserting buffer overruns, and other
kinds of bugs are left as future work. More recently [28],
LAVA has been extended to a small number of additional bug
types. LAVA test cases are generated to satisfy an additional
goal: the bugs must manifest only on a small fraction of
all possible inputs. This requirement seems targeted towards
testing fuzzing tools; we do not think it is necessarily appli-
cable in the context of testing static analysis tools.1 To satisfy
the requirement, LAVA injects bugs with certain patterns (the
“knob and trigger” pattern which relies on magic values). It is
unclear how realistic this bug pattern is with respect to bugs
found in production software. A more detailed discussion of
the suitability of LAVA benchmarks for static analysis evalua-
tion is provided in §VI-E. Another closely related technique is
Apocalypse [17], which is similarly targeted towards creating
challenging benchmarks for fuzzing and concolic execution
tools.
As opposed to the synthetic and wild benchmarks, Evil-
Coder, LAVA, and BUG-INJECTOR are automated and can
create large number of bugs in custom real-world programs.
BUG-INJECTOR uses bug templates and a host program to
produce a suite of programs containing one known bug apiece,
along with an input that can trigger each bug. The available
bug templates cover a large number of CWEs, and new bug
templates are easy to create. Through empirical evaluation
(§VI), we show that BUG-INJECTOR generated benchmarks
are suitable for evaluating and comparing the estimated recall
of static analysis tools.
Other related techniques are mutation testing [30], [31]
and fault injection [32], [33], [34]. Mutation testing is used
to evaluate the quality of a test suite, and is different from
our work because the mutations are much simpler, are not
dynamically targeted, and are not guaranteed to introduce
real bugs. Compared to our work, fault injection techniques
serve a different purpose: they aim to evaluate the robustness
of software in the presence of various kinds of faults, e.g.,
data corruption, errors returned by library functions. Typically,
these techniques inject or emulate faults in software at run-
time, and then compare the dynamic behavior of software
during normal and fault-induced runs. Faults injected by these
1Many famous bugs, e.g. HeartBleed [29], execute on the majority of
possible inputs.
techniques are fairly simple [32], and in contrast to BUG-
INJECTOR, faults are not integrated with the host program.
III. BUG INJECTOR
In this section, we describe the tooling used for BUG-
INJECTOR, introduce bug templates, and describe how BUG-
INJECTOR works. We illustrate the injection of a bug template
into a host program, and discuss potential applications.
A. Tooling
BUG-INJECTOR is implemented using the Software Evo-
lution Library (SEL) [35], an open-source toolchain that
provides a uniform interface for instrumenting, tracing, and
modifying software. SEL supports multiple programming lan-
guages. Currently, BUG-INJECTOR works on C/C++, Java,
and JavaScript2 software. In this paper, we focus on BUG-
INJECTOR as applied to C/C++ software. C/C++ software
modifications are implemented via Clang’s libtooling API.
Clang’s libtooling provides a solid foundation for parsing and
program modification in the presence of the latest C/C++
syntactic features, making BUG-INJECTOR applicable to a
wide range of C/C++ software.
B. Bug templates
BUG-INJECTOR is able to inject a wide range of bug types,
based on the provided bug templates. A bug template is
defined in Common Lisp, and it specifies: (a) the dynamic
and static requirements for a successful bug injection, (b) the
code snippets constituting the bug itself, and (c) how these
code snippets should be integrated into the program. A bug
template consists of one or more patches.3 An example bug
template consisting of a single patch is provided in Figure 1b.
Each patch has the following fields.
code. The buggy code that will be inserted into the host
program. In Figure 1b, the buggy code is a call to memcpy.
The buggy code can contain references to free variables.
free-variables. A list of type-qualified free variables
in the buggy code. These are matched to type-compatible
in-scope variables at the injection location in the host pro-
gram. Occurrences of the free variables in code are replaced
with the matched host program variables before injection. In
Figure 1b, the free variable listing implies that $dst and
$src should be bound to host program variables with type
char*.
precondition. Any boolean predicate constructed using
the following primitives defined over the in-scope variables
($v) at a program point (p) in the dynamic trace:
• value($v, p): the value of $v at p
• size($v, p): the dynamically allocated size of memory
pointed to by $v at p
• ast(p): the abstract syntax tree at p
• name($v): the name of $v
• type($v): the static type of $v
2Java and JavaScript support is experimental, under heavy development.
3A successful bug injection applies all the patches in a bug template.
3
1 void f1(char *src) {
2 char *dst = 0; // ’dst’ initialized to a null ptr
3 memcpy(dst + 0, src, 10); // expected warning: null
4 // ptr argument in call to memory copy function
5 }
(a) Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) regression test, annotated with
expected tool behavior. This test program contains a bug: the first
argument to the memory copy function is null.
code memcpy($dst + 0, $src, $num);
free-variables
$dst: pointer to char
$src: pointer to char
$num: integer
precondition value($dst, p) = 0 ∧ value($num, p) > 1
(b) A bug template containing a single patch corresponding to the
bug in Figure 1a. For presentation, the patch has been abstracted from
its Common Lisp definition.
1 /* global variable declarations */
2 static char *lastout;
3 static char *prog;
4 static int out_byte;
5 /* ... lots of code, some interact with globals */
6 static int grep(int fd) {
7 /* ... more code */
8 + /* from input (./harness.sh test BIN 1) */
9 + /* POTENTIAL FLAW */
10 + memcpy(lastout + 0, prog, out_byte);
11 reset(fd);
12 lastout=0;
(c) The diff resulting from injecting the bug template in 1b into grep.
Here, $dst → lastout, $src → prog, $num → out_byte.
Fig. 1: A CSA regression test (1a), a corresponding bug
template (1b) created manually, and the diff resulting from
injection of this bug template into the grep program (1c).
The primitives value and size allow matching on dynamic
conditions, whereas ast, name, and type allow matching
on static conditions. BUG-INJECTOR uses the precondition
predicate to search the dynamic traces for suitable injection
locations: points in the trace that meet the precondition. The
input that gives rise to a trace is called the “witness” of
that trace. The buggy code injected into the source at the
precondition-matching location will be executed when run
with the witness input. In Figure 1b, the precondition specifies
that at an injection point p, (a) an in-scope variable bound to
$dst is a null pointer, and (b) another in-scope variable bound
to $num has a value > 1.
The example bug template in Figure 1b was manually
created based on an existing regression test (Figure 1a) for
CSA. This regression test contains a bug at the call to memcpy:
that its first argument is a null pointer. A successful injection
of the bug template in Figure 1b will insert a call to memcpy,
where (a) $src, $dst, and $num are replaced with host
program variables, and (b) the variable bound to $dst is
null and the variable bound to $num is > 1, before the call
to memcpy. Thus, the bug injection attempts to create the
same kind of bug, but embedded and integrated with the host
program’s data and control flow complexity. The null value
of the host program variable bound to $dst comes from
an existing sequence of host program events (i.e., it is not
artificially generated): e.g., the pointer might have been set to
null at a distant program point in a different function, or its
value copied from some other pointer which happens to be
null under certain conditions triggered by the witness input.
Typically, creating a bug template from an example bug
requires identifying (a) the relevant buggy code, (b) the free
variables in the buggy code that must be re-bound in the
host program, and (c) preconditions to ensure the bug is
successfully transferred to the host program.
C. Technique
Host
Program
Instrument Execute Inject & Validate
Buggy
Programs
+
Witnesses
Bug TemplatesProgram Inputs
Trace
Points
Fig. 2: BUG-INJECTOR pipeline.
The BUG-INJECTOR pipeline of instrument, execute, and
inject is shown in Figure 2 and described in the algorithm
in Figure 3. BUG-INJECTOR takes three inputs: (1) a host
program, (2) a set of tests for this program, and (3) a set
of bug templates. It attempts to inject bugs from the set of
bug templates into the host program, and returns multiple
different buggy versions of the host program. Each returned
buggy program variant has at least one known bug (the one
that was injected), and is associated with a witness—a test
input which is known to exercise the injected bug.
The BUG-INJECTOR algorithm begins by instrumenting
the host program (Figure 3, line 2). The Instrument method
rewrites the source code of the host program, inserting code
to emit dynamic trace output. Traces include the values of
Input: Host Program, Host : Program
Input: Program Inputs, Suite: {Test}
Input: Bug Templates, Templates : {BugTemplate}
Parameters: NumInjections , MaxTrace
Output: Buggy Program Versions, Bench : {〈Program,Test〉}
1: let Bench ← ∅, TraceDB ← ∅
2: let Inst ← Instrument(Host) ⊲ Instrument
3: for Input ∈ Suite do ⊲ Execute
4: TraceDB ← TraceDB ∪ Collect(Inst , Input ,MaxTrace)
5: end for
6: for Template ∈ Templates do
7: Candidates ← Match(Template.precondition , TraceDB )
8: Sampled ← RandomSample(Candidates ,NumInjections)
9: for 〈Points,Witness〉 ∈ Sampled do
10: Bugged ← Inject(Host , Points , Template) ⊲ Inject
11: if Validate(Bugged , Witness) then ⊲ Validate
12: Bench ← Bench ∪ {(Bugged , Witness)}
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: return Bench
Fig. 3: BUG-INJECTOR algorithm.
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all in-scope variables (currently limited to primitive types
and pointers) at every program statement. The algorithm then
runs the instrumented program with test inputs. The collected
traces (capped by size MaxTrace) and the test inputs that
produced them are stored efficiently in a persistent binary-
format database, TraceDB (line 4).
BUG-INJECTOR then attempts to inject each of the bug
templates NumInjection times. For every bug template, it
uses Match to search TraceDB for candidate program point
sets that correspondingly match the preconditions for all
the patches in that bug template. Match returns a list of
candidates: each candidate is a tuple of points—one program
point per patch in the bug template—and a witness input.
BUG-INJECTOR randomly samples NumInjection candidates
for injection. The candidates picked for injection are then used
by Inject (line 10), which takes the code in the patches of the
bug template and rewrites the source code locations associated
with each of the Points. Source rewriting involves inserting the
associated code snippet into the host program, then renaming
all the free variable names with the precondition-matching and
type-compatible in-scope variables of the host program.
To validate an injection, BUG-INJECTOR adds instrumenta-
tion4 to the modified program to dynamically check that the
pre-conditions hold before the injected bug upon re-execution
againstWitness (line 11). The buggy program Bugged and its
associated Witness are added to the output Bench (line 12).
After exhausting the given number of injections, or when
no more candidate injection points are available, Bench is
returned.
As an example, consider the injection of bug template
given in Figure 1b into the C program grep, resulting in the
buggy variant of grep shown in Figure 1c. In this instance,
BUG-INJECTOR uses host program’s global static variables,
lastout, prog, and out_byte, in the call to memcpy.
For diagnostic purposes, the injected buggy code is optionally
preceded by a comment that includes the input witness for the
injected bug. When buggy grep is run with this input, the
value of lastout is null before the call to memcpy, at least
once during program execution. This injection successfully
violates the “memcpy should not be called with its first
argument being a null pointer” rule, but in a different code
context.
CSA emits a warning about the bug in their regression
test Figure 1a. However, CSA fails to report a warning for
the similar injected bug in this buggy version of grep. CSA
has “lost” this bug due to its injection into a more complex
context.
D. Uses of BUG-INJECTOR
One of the applications of BUG-INJECTOR is to provide
feedback to static analysis tool developers regarding the false-
negative rates of their “checkers” on real-world programs. A
4The validation code is removed before adding it to the benchmark.
typical workflow for building static analysis checkers5 is an
iterative process: (1) develop a checker to detect violations
of a program property, (2) test the static analysis checker on
some manually crafted test programs, (3) deploy the checker
into production, (4) identify failures and false-negative corner
cases for the checker, (5) iterate and improve the checker. BUG-
INJECTOR can improve and accelerate this process. Instead of
manually crafting test cases, we can craft relevant bug tem-
plates. BUG-INJECTOR can then generate checker benchmarks
by injecting these bug templates into real-world programs. The
static analysis checker can then be tested on the generated
benchmarks to obtain early feedback regarding the checker’s
performance (such as expected false-negative rate, scalability),
before deploying the checker into production.
Another application of BUG-INJECTOR is customized eval-
uation of static analysis tools, as we have done in §VI.
We also provided the SAMATE group at NIST with BUG-
INJECTOR. This group is conducting SATE VI [37]: the
sixth iteration of Static Analysis Tool Exposition. SATE is
a non-competitive study of static analysis tool effectiveness,
aiming at improving tools and increasing public awareness and
adoption. SATE VI is already making use of BUG-INJECTOR
generated test programs, in addition to manually crafted test
programs. Further, NIST is expecting to make extensive use
of BUG-INJECTOR for SATE VII, the next iteration of SATE.
To quote the initial experience of the NIST team with BUG-
INJECTOR: “using BUG-INJECTOR to generate benchmarks is
much faster (at least five times as fast) than using our current
manual benchmark generation process.” For SATE VI, the
participating static analysis vendors can compare how well
they perform on BUG-INJECTOR generated benchmarks vs. the
manually created benchmarks, which will be a useful broader
study regarding the effectiveness of BUG-INJECTOR. NIST
also plans to add BUG-INJECTOR generated tests to the SARD
dataset [14].
IV. ESTIMATING STATIC ANALYSIS RECALL
As previously discussed in § I, it is difficult to compute the
exact recall of a tool. Thus, BUG-INJECTOR (as well as all
other related work) estimates the recall of a static analysis
tool using the set of known bugs in a given benchmark, which
is a subset (possibly strict) of all the bugs actually present in
that benchmark. The set of known bugs in a given benchmark
is referred to as the ground truth for the benchmark. In
this section, we discuss some practical issues in representing
ground truth for the purposes of evaluating static analysis
tools.
Ground truth accuracy. That is, each bug in the provided
list must manifest in at least one execution of the program.
LAVA [16] provides backtraces for each test case showing
that the bugs included are real. EvilCoder [15], however, pro-
vides no such guarantees. BUG-INJECTOR benchmarks come
5This workflow is informed by the author’s discussions with static analysis
tool developers and by the static analysis checker development tutorial for
Phasar [36].
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with inputs which can generate dynamically-observed program
states where the bug template preconditions are met. Hence,
the guarantees provided by BUG-INJECTOR are relative to the
correctness of the bug template specification.
Matching ground truth to tool output. Ground truth
must include information such as location and bug type for
each listed bug. This information allows automated or semi-
automated matching of a tool’s output with the ground truth.
There are various pitfalls in providing this information: there
may be multiple locations associated with a bug, multiple bug
types associated with the same bug, multiple bugs in the same
location (depending on the granularity of the location), or
lexically distinct languages used by tools to warn about the
same bug type. Several recent studies [19], [18] elaborate on
these problems.
Real-world bug distribution. BUG-INJECTOR gives us
control over how many of each type of bug we inject. By
injecting bugs of a type that are harder or easier for a given
tool to detect, one can influence the measured recall of the
tool on the generated benchmark. Unfortunately, it is difficult
to know the real-world distribution of different bug types. This
does not prevent the use of BUG-INJECTOR for comparing the
relative recall of two tools on particular bug types of interest
or between different settings of the same tool.
LAVA [16] injects only buffer overflows, so the bug type
is known up front. Every test case includes a backtrace that
showcases the bug. While this may be sufficient for evaluating
fuzzers or manually inspecting static analysis results, it can be
difficult to automate. For example, do you credit a tool with
finding a bug only if it warns about the location at the top
of the backtrace, or is it sufficient for it to warn about any
location in the backtrace? Are there other relevant locations in
the program that can be justifiably reported by static analysis
tools? For the LAVA-1 dataset, we found empirically that key
locations in the backtraces can be matched to invocations
of the synthetic method lava_get() in the source code.
Consequently, we interpret the ground truth to be the set of
these locations.
For our BUG-INJECTOR benchmark, such additional ground
truth information is implicit in the bug templates (which
specify the bug type) and the locations where the injection
was performed. As shown in the example in Figure 1, the
injection location can be determined by examining the source
code difference between the original and injected program.
A further hurdle to automation is that there is no standard-
ized format for the output of a static analysis tool that all tools
adhere to, and often no direct way to determine which specific
bug a tool is reporting. In practice, the evaluator must typically
rely on manually created heuristics that match the tool’s
reports with ground truth based on location and warning type.
This approach has some limitations, notably the possibility of
mistakenly failing to credit the tool with a true positive because
it reports a slightly different but related bug, or because it
reports the correct bug at a slightly different location. Adding
some “tolerances” to the location heuristics, such as allowing
a neighborhood of several lines of code around the expected
bug location, can mitigate this problem but may cause its own
issues if the tool detects unrelated bugs in the neighborhood. In
our experimental evaluation §VI-B, we explicitly discuss how
we credit tools for finding appropriate bugs in our benchmarks.
V. OUR BENCHMARK SUITES
In this section, we describe two BUG-INJECTOR-generated
benchmark suites. Both these benchmark suites, and the bug
templates used to generate them, are available online for
use by the community [38]. We plan to maintain a library
of bug templates that can be used for different user-chosen
evaluations.
A. Selection of host programs
TABLE II: Host programs used for evaluation. LOC gives the
lines of code in the programs. The rest of the columns are
described in §V-C.
Project Version LOC Prep
Time
Query
Time
Sites/
KLOC
grep [39] 2.0 12K 66 1.76 372.76
nginx [40] 1.13.0 178K 766 5.03 7.62
We use the open-source projects listed in Table II as the
host programs for generating our benchmark suites. We have
successfully injected bugs into other C/C++ host programs
(total of 15 real-world programs to date), but we have not
included them in this paper due to resource constraints in
running experiments (§VI). One such excluded program is
WireShark version 1.12.9, which has 2.3 million lines of code:
it is the largest program we have successfully injected bugs
into. This demonstrates BUG-INJECTOR’s ability to inject into
a variety of real-world projects. An important criteria for pick-
ing host programs is the availability of test suites with good
code coverage: they provide a large number of distinct trace
points for BUG-INJECTOR, improving the chances of finding
many suitable injection points by matching preconditions.
B. Selection of bug templates
Bug Template
Source
No. of
Templates
mean counts
LOC FVars CF Stmts
CSA [41] 10 3.1 0.8 0.2
Infer [42], [43] 6 4.2 0.8 0.8
Juliet tests [2] 55 7.8 1.3 0.9
TABLE III: The number of bug templates from each source.
The last three columns provide the means over each set of
templates for: (a) the number of lines of code to be injected, (b)
the number of free variables to be rebound, and (c) the number
of control-flow statements in the injected code, respectively.
We create bug templates from three sources (shown in
Table III) to satisfy two different goals. First, we want our
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benchmark suite to allow a fair evaluation of CSA [21] and
Infer [22], and inject bug types that these tools care about and
are expected to find. Both tools support the detection of buffer
overflows (BO) and null pointer dereferences (NPD). There-
fore, we collect examples of BO and NPD bugs that appear
in these tool’s documentation [41], [42] and regression test
suites [43]. We manually verified that each example contains
the bug they claim to contain, and then converted the example
to a bug template. We also checked that at least one tool
warns on each example bug snippet. The manual conversion
of a bug example to a bug template is fairly straightforward
(described in § III-B), and only took on the order of few
minutes per example. Each of the 16 bug templates collected
from CSA and Infer are injected upto 30 times into each of
the two host programs in Table II, to create benchmark suite
B1, with a total of 591 program variants. Note that a bug
template may have been injected fewer than 30 times into a
host program because of insufficient number of precondition-
matching locations or failed validation. In B1, each of the 16
bug templates has been injected at least once. B1 is used for
answering the research questions (§VI-A) RQ1, RQ2, and
RQ3.
Second, we want to demonstrate that BUG-INJECTOR can
inject a wide variety of bug types and CWE categories [20].
To this end, we automatically converted 55 bug examples
from the Juliet test suite (version 1.3. [2]) into bug templates;
these bug examples span 55 unique CWE types, from stack-
based buffer overflows (CWE-121) to type confusion (CWE-
843). We exploited the uniform structure of Juliet tests to
automatically create these bug templates: we extract free
variables, preconditions, and code to inject from the Juliet
test suite using both static and dynamic information from
each bug example. We created the benchmark suite B2, which
contains 2,492 program variants, by injecting each of the 55
bug templates sourced from Juliet tests upto 30 times into each
of the host programs. Each of the 55 bug templates has been
injected at least once. Many bug types in Juliet tests are out of
scope for CSA and Infer, therefore we do not evaluate these
tools on B2 in this paper. B2 serves to answer RQ4.
The program variants with bugs are uniformly formatted
using a code beautification tool, ensuring the injection does not
stand out due to code-style differences. As shown in Table III,
the bug templates typically include a small amount of code.
These characteristics, along with the use of existing program
variables (through free variable rebinding), allow the injec-
tions to meld with the existing code and look realistic (e.g.,
see Figure 1c, or examine any of the benchmark programs).
C. Performance of BUG-INJECTOR
As discussed in § III, BUG-INJECTOR operates in a pipeline
of several stages. Performance in these stages depends on
characteristics of the host program, its tests, and the bug
template set. Table II summarizes the key characteristics and
performance data for the host programs. Timing experiments
were performed on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.10 GHz machine
with 72 cores and 128 GB of RAM.
In the instrument and execute stages, BUG-INJECTOR parses
the host program, adds instrumentation, and runs the program
with test inputs to collect traces. The time required for this
stage depends on the size of the program, the number of
variables it contains, and the number of input tests to run; the
“Prep Time” column in Table II, given in seconds, provides
this information for each host program. This provided prep
time is a one time cost, which gets amortized over the number
of bugs to be injected into the same host program.
The inject stage involves searching the trace database for
points satisfying the bug template preconditions. The time
required per injection depends on the number of points col-
lected in the trace, the percentage of points which satisfy the
precondition and free variable requirements, as well as the
complexity of the precondition. The “Query Time” column
gives the median time (in seconds) per query. The “Sites/K-
LOC” column in Table II provides the number of matching
host-program sites that are suited for injection based on our
bug templates, per 1000 lines of code. The grep program
contained a large number of string and integer variables, and
therefore showed higher density of potential injection sites;
conversely, nginx, with few integer variables, had lower
density of injection sites.
Lastly, BUG-INJECTOR edits the program, applies code
formatting to the buggy software, and writes it out to disk. The
time required to apply code formatting and printing the buggy
program is directly proportional to the program size. Overall,
the prep time dominates the pipeline as the most expensive
stage. Given the offline and automatic nature of benchmark
creation, we believe the performance of BUG-INJECTOR is
reasonable.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we outline the research questions that direct
our evaluation, describe our experimental methodology, report
and discuss the results of our experiments, and compare our
benchmark with the LAVA test cases [23].
A. Research questions
The goal of our evaluation is to answer the following
research questions about BUG-INJECTOR and its generated
benchmarks.
RQ1: Do the benchmarks contain bugs which are seemingly
in scope for the tool but which the tool fails to detect?
Such bugs could provide useful concrete feedback to the
tool’s developers.
RQ2: Can the benchmarks discriminate between different
static analysis tools?
RQ3: Can the benchmarks discriminate between different pa-
rameter settings for a given static analysis tool? Such an
ability suggests the use of BUG-INJECTOR for automated
tuning of a tool’s parameters specific to a given codebase.
RQ4: Can BUG-INJECTOR create benchmarks that include
bugs from multiple CWEs? Such an ability shows whether
the technique is applicable to multiple bug types.
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In addition to answering the above research questions, we
also compare BUG-INJECTOR with the LAVA test suite with
respect to the same research themes.
B. Experimental setup and methodology
Static analysis tools and configurations. We perform our ex-
periments using two open-source state-of-the-art static analysis
tools for C/C++ programs: Clang Static Analyzer (CSA) [21]
and Infer [22]. We use CSA version 3.86, and run the tool on
Ubuntu 16.04. We use CSA with the analyzer configuration
mode set to “shallow” (CSA-S), as well as the default mode
“deep” (CSA-D). CSA-S mode changes certain default analysis
parameters, such as the style of the inter-procedural analysis
and maximum inlinable size. We use the term CSA to refer to
both modes. CSA is run with all the default checkers enabled,
along with the optional alpha, security, osx, llvm,
nullability, and optin checkers.
We use Infer version 0.14, and run it from the tool’s
official Docker image. Infer is run with default options and
compute-analytics, biabduction, quandary, and
bufferoverrun enabled. For both CSA and Infer, our in-
tention is to enable as many checkers as possible to maximize
the tool’s chance of finding the injected bugs.
Projected recall. This metric computes the percentage of the
BUG-INJECTOR injected bugs found by a tool. We report this
value by rounding to a whole number percentage. To determine
whether a tool found an injected bug successfully, as discussed
in § IV, we consider the locations of the bug injection as the
bug locations. We credit a tool with finding an injected bug if
it reports a bug of an appropriate type on at least one of the
injected code lines. The table below summarizes which tool-
specific bug types (cell contents) reported by the tools (row
headers) are considered to correspond to the injected bug types
(column headers). We interpret the bug types reported by the
tools quite generously, to maximize their chances of being
credited with finding the injected bugs.
Buffer overrun (BO) Null pointer dereference (NPD)
CSA Out of bound array access,
Result of operation is
garbage or undefined,
malloc() size overflow
Dereference of null pointer,
Uninitialized argument value,
Argument with ‘nonull’ attribute
passed null
Infer Array out of bounds, Buffer
overrun, Memory leak, Stack
variable address escape
Array out of bounds, Buffer over-
run, Dangling pointer derefer-
ence, Null dereference, Memory
leak
C. Experiments and results
To help answer research questions RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3, we
run CSA-S, CSA-D, and Infer, on benchmark B1 (described
in §V). Tables IV and V provide the projected recall of the
tools on various partitionings of B1.
The two tables provide different views of the same ex-
perimental results. Table IV partitions the results by bug
6This is the default version available on Ubuntu 16.04.
TABLE IV: Projected recall of different tools for various
pairs of bug template sources and host programs. Last row
summarizes the results over the entire benchmark suite B1.
Bug
Template
Source
Host
Program
No. of
Bugs
CSA-S CSA-D Infer
CSA
grep 251 88% 69% 45%
nginx 122 92% 92% 52%
Infer
grep 179 36% 37% 50%
nginx 39 69% 69% 18%
Both Both 591 72% 64% 46%
TABLE V: Projected recall of different tools for various pairs
of bug types and host programs.
Bug
Type
Host
Program
No. of
Bugs
CSA-S CSA-D Infer
NPD
grep 98 82% 67% 15%
nginx 60 90% 90% 20%
BO
grep 332 61% 53% 57%
nginx 101 84% 84% 58%
template source (Table III) and host program (Table II). The
last row provides results on the entire B1 benchmark. Table V
partitions the results by injected bug type (NPD or BO) and
host program. The “No. of Bugs” column in both these tables
describes the number of benchmark programs–each containing
one known bug—in the specified partition. The rightmost six
rows in both the tables provide the projected recall of the tools
on the given benchmark partition. The highest projected recall
in each row is highlighted.
A tool can obtain higher projected recall by simply reporting
more warnings overall, which will increase its chances of also
reporting an injected bug. A tool could also take a lot longer
than is acceptable to a user to report bugs. Therefore, it is
instructive to look at two additional metrics: “Warnings per
KLOC” and “Time taken”. Table VI reports these metrics.
The columns under “Warnings per KLOC” in Table VI
provide the average number of total warnings reported by the
tools for every thousand lines of code, on the benchmark suite
B1. The number provided after the ± symbol is the standard
deviation (rounded to one decimal place) over all variants
of that host program. This metric can be helpful to check
that a tool is not reporting so many warnings on real-world
programs that it is effectively unusable. Note that comparing
this metric directly between two analysis tools which do not
TABLE VI: Total warnings reported per KLOC and average
time taken by the tools.
Host
Warnings per KLOC Time taken (seconds)
CSA-S CSA-D Infer CSA-S CSA-D Infer
grep 7.9±.2 9.7±.2 1.9±.1 14.7 41.1 20.5
nginx 6.8±.0 2.8±.0 0.8±.1 229.6 366.1 338.7
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have comparable warning classes (such as Infer vs. CSA) is not
particularly meaningful. On “grep”, CSA-D reports more total
warnings than CSA-S, whereas, on “nginx”, CSA-S reports
more total warnings than CSA-D.
The columns under “Time taken” in Table VI provide the
average time taken by the tool to run on a given host program.
We run each tool five times on a four-core Intel(R) Xeon(R)
2.10Ghz machine with 16GB RAM and report the average.
CSA-S runs much faster than CSA-D.
Addressing RQ1. The benchmark suite B1 consists of the
bugs that CSA and Infer care about injected into popular
open-source programs (representing the expected targets of the
chosen static analysis tools). Tables IV andV show that both
the tools detect some but not all of the injected bugs.
If a tool reports a bug on a small example with a simple
context, we might expect that the tool also reports a similar
bug in a more complex setting. However, in the case of both
CSA and Infer—the leading open-source static analysis tools
for C/C++—we find that they “lose” bugs (projected recall is
not 100%) across all rows in Tables IV andV. That is, CSA
and Infer find bugs in their respective documentation examples
and regression tests, but in many cases they lose the ability
to find the “same” bug when it is injected and integrated into
a larger program. These “lost” bugs can represent concrete
feedback for the analysis tool developers.
Addressing RQ2. Tables IV andV show that our generated
benchmarks can be used for contrasting the projected recall
of the evaluated tools. Depending on the specific subset of
the benchmark suite (i.e., table row) that is of interest to the
evaluator, different tools have higher projected recall. Thus,
BUG-INJECTOR can be used to perform tool evaluations to
suit specific customer needs by providing control over the
distribution of bug templates and host programs. CSA-S has
the highest recall on benchmark suite B1 as a whole.
Addressing RQ3. Static analysis tools are typically con-
figurable, with the chosen configuration affecting tool re-
call, precision, and scalability. There is generally no single
best configuration: it depends on several factors including
the codebase being analyzed, the warning classes that are
of interest, etc. To evaluate how our generated benchmarks
discriminate different configurations of the same tool, we
examine two configurations of Clang Static Analyzer: CSA-D
and CSA-S. In a majority of cases in B1, CSA-S has equal or
higher projected recall compared to CSA-D, while also being
significantly faster. This is a surprising result that may be of
interest to CSA users and developers.
In this paper, we only compare two configuration points
of CSA. However, CSA (and many other analysis tools)
have several configuration parameters. Projected recall from
BUG-INJECTOR generated tests can be used (in conjuction
with other metrics of interest) to tune the settings of these
parameters for a given codebase.
Addressing RQ4. BUG-INJECTOR is able to generate the
benchmark B2, which contains injected bugs corresponding to
55 different CWEs, based on bug templates sourced from Juliet
test suite version 1.3. This artifact shows that BUG-INJECTOR
can be used to inject a wide-variety of bug types.
D. Causes of lost bugs
A large number of injected bugs are “lost” by the evaluated
tools (ranging between 28% to 54% lost bugs per tool). An
extensive study of all lost bug cases by each tool is out of
scope for this work. Instead, we sampled a small number
of randomly-selected lost bugs to manually check whether
there were particular patterns or language constructs that were
causing the tools to lose track of the bugs. However, we found
no single dominant pattern for the lost bugs: there seems to
be a long tail of several issues that cause tools to lose bugs.
In our limited study, we see that each lost bug belongs to one
of three categories:
needs-fix: the tool needs to be fixed for the bug to be found
param: adjusting the tool’s parameters can find the bug
expected: the bug is lost by design
Below, we discuss some simplified examples of lost bugs
in B1. We mark each discussed bug with our diagnosis with
respect to the above categories. We have reported [44], [45],
[46] some of these lost bugs to the analysis developers.
Infer fails to report [45] any warnings in a function that has
enum declarations of the following form (needs-fix):
1 enum { L, R } dirs[12];
Infer fails to report [44] the null pointer dereference in this
simple case (needs-fix or param):
1 int *nullable; int *firstpos; int *lastpos;
2 int * buf = 0;
3 nullable = malloc(2*sizeof(int));
4 firstpos = malloc(2*sizeof(int));
5 lastpos = malloc(2*sizeof(int));
6 for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) { /* no-op */ }
7 *buf = 1; // null pointer dereference
8 nullable++; firstpos++; lastpos++;
Infer fails to report any bugs present in the source code of
those functions for which library models exist (expected). The
source code of such functions are ignored. This behavior may
result in supply-chain attacks going unnoticed by the tool.
CSA fails to report [46] a buffer overrun in the presence of
an intervening function call, presumably due to unsound early
termination in the tool’s path exploration (needs-fix).
Many of the bugs lost by CSA can be found by tuning
the analysis parameters (param). E.g., high values of the
parameter -maxloop, which controls the number of times
a block can be visited before giving up, finds many lost bugs.
Thus, BUG-INJECTOR generated benchmarks can expose
the various real-world scenarios in which an analysis tool can
fail to report a bug, which is of interest to both analysis users
and analysis developers.
E. Comparison with LAVA benchmarks
We run CSA and Infer tools on the LAVA-1 benchmarks.
The LAVA-1 benchmarks consist of 69 variations of the file
program, with each variant having one injected buffer overflow
bug. As discussed in § IV, we stipulate for the sake of this
evaluation that the bug location is the line consisting of a
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1 /* inside a for loop */
2 if (ml->map)
3 apprentice_unmap(((ml->map))+(lava_get())*((0x12345678
4 <= (lava_get()) && 0x123456f8 >= (lava_get())) ||
5 (0x12345678 <= __bswap_32((lava_get())) && 0x123456f8
6 >= __bswap_32((lava_get())))));
7 free(ml);
Fig. 4: Example LAVA-injected bug.
lava_get() call, and give a tool credit for identifying the
bug if it specifies a location within 5 lines of this. In all LAVA-
1 test cases, we found that the lava_get() call location
matched the first location provided in the corresponding back-
trace included with the LAVA corpus.
CSA reports between 41 and 51 warnings on each of the
LAVA-1 benchmarks. In 58 of the 69 programs, CSA does
not report on any LAVA-injected bugs. In the remaining 11
programs, CSA issues warnings at the injected bug locations.
Upon manual inspection of each of these examples, we deter-
mined these warnings to be unrelated to buffer overflows.7
Infer reports between 16 and 18 warnings on each of the
LAVA-1 benchmarks. However, none of the Infer warnings are
at the LAVA-injected bug locations.
To summarize, both CSA and Infer report warnings on the
LAVA-1 benchmarks, but none of these are related to the
LAVA-injected bugs. Thus, the projected recall of both of
these tools is 0% on the LAVA-1 benchmarks. This result is
not particularly surprising, as LAVA is biased towards testing
the limits of fuzzing tools, and injects code that looks like
the snippet in Figure 4. Such bugs would typically be out of
scope for accurate reasoning by most static analysis tools, as
the tools have to make static approximations and/or heuristic
choices that balance precision, recall, and scalability. These
results—that leading open-source static analysis tools have
zero projected recall—indicate that LAVA benchmarks are not
well-suited for discriminating between different static analysis
tools (refer RQ2), or that they include bugs that are in scope
for the evaluated static analysis tools (refer RQ1). Also, LAVA
can only inject a very small number of bug kinds (refer RQ4).
Therefore, while LAVA has been successful in advancing
fuzzing techniques [47] and helping create capture-the-flag-
style competitions [28], it is less relevant in evaluating static
analysis tools.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
BUG-INJECTOR currently chooses an injection point in the
host program uniformly at random from all the dynamic trace
points that match the bug template’s preconditions. Thus, host
program points that are exercised more frequently by the
accompanying tests are more likely to be used for injection,
as they appear more frequently in the dynamic traces. BUG-
INJECTOR can be combined with coverage-increasing input-
7The reported warnings were one of: “pointer of type void* used in
arithmetic”, “nested extern declaration of vasprintf”, “implicit declaration
of function vasprintf”, “pointer arithmetic on non-array variables relies
on memory layout: which is dangerous”.
generation techniques like concolic testing [48] to obtain an
improved program-wide distribution of injected bugs.
BUG-INJECTOR does not currently support the injection
of concurrency-related bugs. We plan to add such support.
Our first step will be to improve instrumentation so that
concurrency-related information such as the current thread and
process is available in the trace.
BUG-INJECTOR cannot always inject a bug template into a
host program, because there is not always a dynamic trace
point that matches all the preconditions and free-variable
requirements for the template. To increase the chances of
finding injection points in a host program, we plan to enhance
BUG-INJECTOR to allow for variable rebinding to aggregate
structs and fields.
We envision running BUG-INJECTOR’s pipeline multiple
times in an evolutionarily-guided heuristic search. This process
would allow injection of multiple bugs into a single host pro-
gram, maximizing an objective function that balances factors
such as number of injected bugs, naturalness of code [49],
realistic distribution of bugs [50], [51], retention of the orig-
inal program behavior, and syntactic/stylistic similarity [52]
between the buggy program and the original program. BUG-
INJECTOR is built using SEL, which supports evolutionary
search with multi-objective fitness functions. Leveraging this
support, we have early prototypes that fulfill this vision.
Regarding our experimental methodology, the main threat
to validity relates to how we measure whether a tool finds
a specific injected bug, both for BUG-INJECTOR and LAVA
test cases. As we explain in § IV and §VI, we use simple
heuristics to match the location contained in the tool’s warning
with the location of the known bug and determine that the
correct bug has been identified if the bug types match and the
locations are within a certain maximum distance. We could
refine this heuristic by using more sophisticated matching
techniques from related work on the issue of deduplicating
and/or clustering tool warning reports [53], [54].
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce BUG-INJECTOR, a system
that automatically generates bug-containing benchmarks suit-
able for evaluating and testing software analysis tools. BUG-
INJECTOR operates by injecting bug templates into real-world
programs, and is able to create custom benchmarks that are
real-world-like, can draw from a wide variety of bug types, and
come with bug-triggering inputs. Our experimental evaluation
shows that BUG-INJECTOR benchmarks are useful for several
purposes: (a) showcasing bugs that are seemingly in scope
for a tool to find but that the tool misses, (b) discriminating
between and guiding the improvement of static analysis tools,
and (c) tuning tool parameters for a specific codebase. We
also show that BUG-INJECTOR can create bugs from multiple
CWEs.
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